MARICO MARINE GLOBAL MARITIME EXPERTISE

PORTS OF JERSEY

INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT: JERSEY LIFEBOAT ASSOCIATION GROUNDING

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MARINE AND RISK CONSULTANTS LTD

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 11 November 2021 the Harbour Master Ports of Jersey appointed Marine and Risk Consultants Ltd (Marico Marine) to investigate the circumstances surrounding the grounding of the Jersey Lifeboat Association (JLA), *Sir Max Aiken III*, on the rocks of Pierre au Poisson on Wednesday 10 November 2021.

The investigation was conducted by Capt. [redacted] who has an extensive Marine background, having sailed as Master, Marine Pilot, Harbour Master, and who is currently a Principal Marine Consultant with Marico Marine.

The following are considered important elements of this investigation report:

- The weather conditions were fine, wind SSE 5- 10 kts, sea state slight with good visibility;
- It was observed that the night was clear and moonless;
- All Aids to Navigation (AtN) for the passage were in good working order;
- This was considered a non-urgent incident; therefore, all equipment should have been set up and been fully operational prior to departure;
- The setting up of the chart potter while underway distracted the coxswain, who was now facing aft, lost his spatial awareness and made two unintentional and unnoticed small turns to starboard;
- There were no reported defects on the JLB *Sir Max Aiken III;*
- The *Sir Max Aitken III* is a Jersey declared SAR facility; and
- The coxswain and navigator are both highly experienced.

The recommendations are as follows:

- Harbour Authority review and audit of the JLA Safety Management System (SMS) and personnel training syllabus;
- Bridge Team Management, training and regularly exercised;
- All equipment to be set up and fully operational prior to sailing;
- Qualified personnel for Trauma Risk Management (TRIM) to be identified;
- Training Matrix for each month to be identified;
- All crew members to fully understand their roles and responsibilities through a toolbox pre departure briefing prior to sailing;
- After an incident of this nature all crew members are to receive a professional medical / trauma examination before resuming duty;
- Chart Plotter to be re-positioned to a more suitable position in front of the coxswain;
- Statement of Facts to be taken as soon as reasonably practicable; and
- Harbour Authority to consider the need to extend their Drug and Alcohol powers within their authorised jurisdiction.

Further details on the above principal conclusions and recommendations are in the body of the report.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Detail
AIS	Automatic Identification System
AHM	Acting Harbour Master
ALB	All Weather Lifeboat
AtN	Aids to Navigation
CGWO	Coastguard Watch Officer
DHM	Delegated Harbour Master
ETA	Estimated Time of Arrival
FWD	Forward
HW	High Water
JLA	Jersey Lifeboat Association
JCG	Jersey Coastguard
kn	Knot (unit of speed equal to nautical mile per hour, approx. 1.15mph)
LOA	Length Over-All
m	Metre
MANCHEPLAN	Anglo-French joint maritime contingency plan for the English Channel
Marico Marine	Marine and Risk Consultants Ltd
M.E	Main Engines
MOC	Maritime Operations Centre
nm	Nautical Mile
NRA	Navigation Risk Assessment
NtM	Notice to Mariners
PLB	Personnel Locator Beacon
PoJ	Port of Jersey
POB	Persons Onboard
RBO	Rescue Boat Organisation
RNLI	Royal National Lifeboat Institution
SAR	Search and Rescue
SMC	Search Mission Coordinator
SMS	Safety Management System
SoF	Statement of Fact
SOLAS	Safety Of Life At Sea
TA	Training Assessor
TOS	Traffic Organisation Service
TRIM	Trauma Risk Assessment
VHF	Very High Frequency
VTS	Vessel Traffic Service
VTSO	Vessel Traffic Service Officer
XJB	Cross Jobourg Traffic

1 INTRODUCTION

On 11 November 2021, the Harbour Master for the Ports of Jersey appointed Marico Marine to investigate the circumstances surrounding the grounding of the Jersey Lifeboat Association (JLA) *Sir Max Aitken III*.

At 22:10 on 10 November 2021, The Jersey Coastguard (JCG) received a VHF call from the JLA *Sir Max Aitken III* stating that she had run aground on the Pierre au Poisson rocks off Noirmont Point, Pos Lat 49° 09.922'N Long 002°10.412'W.

The Lifeboat had been tasked to a non-urgent incident (sailing yacht entangled on fishing gear) 5nm NW of Jersey Lat 49º 19.65' N Long 002º 18.76' W and was proceeding at 17kts through the in-shore Northwest Passage route. The weather conditions were fine, wind SSE 5- 10 kts, sea state slight with good visibility, it was observed that the night was clear and moonless. Also, the glimmer from the chart plotter facing forward meant that there was glare against the forward window which made it difficult to see out.

After the grounding, the crew assessed that there were no injuries, water ingress or pollution and confirmed to the JCG that she would return at slow speed without any need of assistance.

The *Sir Max Aitken III is a* declared Search and Rescue (SAR) facility for the Jersey Coastguard.

The investigation, as detailed below, was conducted by Capt. [redacted]. The main elements of the investigation were as follows:

- Interviews with the following key personnel:
  - PoJ Delegated Harbour Master (DHM);
  - PoJ Duty Watch Officer;
  - JLA Coxswain ;
  - JLA Mechanic :
  - JLA Navigator; and
  - JLA Crewman .
- Written Statements from the following personnel:
  - PoJ Duty Watch Officer;
  - PoJ DHM;
  - PoJ Acting Harbour Master (AHM);
  - JLA Coxswain;
  - JLA Mechanic ;
  - JLA Navigator; and
  - JLA Four Crewmen.

- Extracts from the following records:
- VTS AIS screenshots; and
- Nautical Chart BA 1137 SW corner approaches, chart supplied by Ports of Jersey.

All times in this investigation report are UTC.

2 FACTUAL INFORMATION

2.1 STATEMENT OF FACTS

Taken from interviews & statements from PoJ Duty Watch Officer, JLA Coxswain, JLA Navigator and Port of Jerseys Incident report form.

Sir Max Aitken III is an Ex-RNLI Tyne class lifeboat now operated by the Jersey Lifeboat Association (JLA) and a declared Search and Rescue (SAR) facility to the Jersey Coastguard (JCG).

21:32 Wednesday 10 November the Vessel Traffic Service Officer (VTSO) received a phone call from Cross Jobourg (XJB) requesting diving assistance for a 11m sailing boat which had become entangled in fishing gear in a position 5nm NW of Jersey Lat 49° 19.65' N Long 002° 18.76' W, there were 5 POB with no injuries with a Massif 31 yacht alongside to assist.

21:32 Acting Harbour Master (AHM) who was on call as the Duty Officer and Search Mission Coordinator (SMC) was telephoned, and it was agreed to page the crew of the JLA *Sir Max Aitken III*.

21:42 JLA All Weather Lifeboat (ALB) crew were paged for assembly.

21:57 JLA *Sir Max Aitken III* called JCG on VHF Ch 82 stating they were launching.

The mechanic who normally acts as the VHF operator, was starting the Main Engines (ME). Therefore, the navigator took over the VHF operations, once the mechanic started the ME, and instead of taking over the communications took over as the navigator and switched on the chart plotter (which is situated behind the coxswain's position). The navigator gave the position to the mechanic who then entered it into the chart plotter.

22:05 At this time the coxswain asked the navigator to set up a full route to obtain an accurate ETA. The navigator tried to build up a fuller route to the destination but the functionality of building a route on the chart plotter to the casualty was not given as an option which rendered him confused. The navigator therefore attempted to set the waypoints in manually and build up a route from the beginning. During this time the coxswain became distracted and lost his spatial awareness as he turned round to discuss the situation with the navigator. It was at this point that the coxswain made two unintentional small turns to starboard that went unnoticed. The chart plotter was turned to face forward so the coxswain could observe the chart plotter, the chart plotter was set to day mode therefore the glare of the plotter further restricted the coxswain's night vision. It was at this point that the *Sir Max Aitken III* made contact and grounded on the Pierre au Poisson rocks (**Figure 3**).



Figure 1: Sir Max Aitken III (highlighted in red) AIS track before incident



Figure 2: JLA Sir Max Aitken III (highlighted red) as she ran aground.

Figure 3: Pierre Au Poisson Rocks.

22:10 *Sir Max Aitken III* contacted JCG on VHF 82 stating that she had made contact and grounded with the Pierre au Poisson rocks south of Noirmont Point (**Figure 4**).

22:14 *Sir Max Aitken III* contacted JCG on VHF 82 stating that they were assessing the damage, but no water ingress, no pollution, no persons injured, rudder damaged but operational with both propellors in working order and no further assistance was required.

22:25 *Sir Max Aitken III* confirms to JCG on VHF 82 that they could return at slow speed without any assistance and was observed on AIS and radar to be returning to port.

22:37 The Delegated Harbour Master (DHM), was informed of the SAR incident from the Search Mission Coordinator (SMC) and advised that the incident was under control.



Figure 4: Noirmont Point

22:48 *Sir Max Aitken III* returns on station. The crew undertook a verification of the vessel and confirmed no water ingress or pollution.

23:14 *Sir Max Aitken III* contacted JCG on VHF 82 and informed them that the vessel would be off station until further notice.

23:30 JLB responsible person informed.

23:31 JLA tried to contact the Certifying Authority 'MECAL' without success (subsequently contacted the following morning).

23:35 DHM arrived at Albert Pier; he observed that the crew appeared to be in shock but all phyically OK, and didn't require medical attention. The DHM offered the coxswain a breathalyser test to rule out the possibility of alcohol as a factor, but the coxswain declined the suggestion.

The coxswain explained that it had been a long day and he was physically exhaused. He was also travelling to France early the following morning, and would rather not wait any longer to take the test. This was duly acknowledged by the DHM.



Figure 5: Extract of chart BA-1137, Approaches to St Helier Showing Location of Incident

2.2 TIMELINE OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

Table 1: Timeline of Significant Events

Time (UTC) 10th November 2021	Event
21:32	VTSO received a phone call from Cross Jobourg (which is the neighbouring French coastguard station) requesting assistance for a sailing boat which was caught on fishing gear, with 5 POB, Approx. 5nm NW of Jersey.
21:32	AHM informed and with no immediate threat to life the JLA All-Weather Lifeboat (ALB) was chosen as the correct asset to use.
21:39	JLA, ALB coxswain was contacted, and confirmed that the JLA was available to assist.
21:42	The JLA, ALB was paged for crew assembly
21:57	*Sir Max Aitken III* called on VHF 82 (JCG) stating they were launching on service.
22:10	*Sir Max Aitken III* informs JCG that they had grounded on the Pierre au Poisson rocks, crew were assessing for damage and wellbeing of the crew.
22:14	*Sir Max Aitken III* contacts JCG and informs them that they had assessed the damage, no water ingress, no pollution, no-one injured. One port rudder had been damaged but the starboard one was still operational as were both ME.
22:19	AHM arrives at the Maritime Operations Centre (MOC).
22:25	*Sir Max Aitken III* contacts JCG and informs them that they would station at slow speed without any need of assistance. The *SIR MAX AIKEN III* was observed on AIS and radar returning to port and stating they had lost steering; their track was observed as slow and steady.
22:48	*SIR Max Aitken III* is back on station. Crew undertake a thorough verification of the vessel and confirm no water ingress, no pollution and a very short debrief.
23:14	*Sir Max Aitken III* is taken off station until further notice.
23:20	Responsible person informed.
23:35	DHM arrives at Albert Pier. The crew appeared to be in shock but all OK and were not suffering any injuries.

2.3 POST-INCIDENT REPORT AND ACTIONS

The *Sir Max Aitken III* was inspected by their registered Certified Authority 'MECAL' (International Marine Consultants) for an occasional survey following the damage.

Examiner's general comments & recommendations.

Due to the defects, it was not possible to repair the vessel in Jersey due to no specialist repair companies, and therefore the vessel was required to sail to the UK mainland for repair. The vessel has been prepared for the voyage. This was composed of:

- Setting the port rudder fixed in place at amidships;
- Propellor damage has been smoothed; and
- The bilge Keels have been filled with polyester resin filler.

2.3.1 MECAL Recommendations

A short-term single voyage conditional certificate for a single voyage to a repair yard was issued subject to a satisfactory sea trial, as confirmed by a MECAL surveyor, with agreement to limiting wind/sea conditions forecast for the voyage.

Figure 6: Damages to the JLA Sir Max Aitken III.

2.3.2 Actions Taken

Table 2: Actions Taken

Date	Action
11/11/21	Certifying Authority informed;
12/11/21	Crew debrief;
15/11/21	*Sir Max Aitken III* taken out of the water;
15/11/21	Initial survey
16/11/21	MECAL Occasional Class Survey;
18/11/21	MECAL Single Voyage Survey issued, *Sir Max Aitken III* departs for Berthon Boat Yard Lymington.
18/11/21	*Sir Max Aitken III* arrives in Berthon Boat Yard Lymington.

2.4 VESSEL

Vessel Name:	*Sir Max Aitken III*
Vessel Flag:	Jersey
Official Number:	713000
Vessel Type:	Tyne Class Lifeboat
Length Overall:	14.30m
Year of Build:	1987

2.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS

Table 3: Environmental Conditions Issued by the Jersey Met at 16:00 UTC Wednesday 10 November 2021

Environmental Factor	Forecast
Wind speed and direction	S 1-3, becoming S -SE 2-4, veering S -SW by dusk
Visibility	Good
Sea Swell State	Smooth /Slight.
Tidal and Tidal State	LW 16:47 (UTC): 3.0m HW 22:30 (UTC): 9.0m
Outlook	S- SW 3-4 becoming SW 4-6, veering SW – W 5-7

2.6 CREW OF JLB SIR MAX AITKEN III

- Coxswain;
- Mechanic;
- Navigator; and
- Four Crewmen.

2.7 JERSEY LIFEBOAT ASSOCIATION

The formation of the Jersey Lifeboat Association (JLA) was formally approved by the Royal Court on the 2 February 2018.The objectives of the JLA are:

- To save lives, promote safety and provide relief from disaster, in relation to the coastal waters of Jersey; and
- To advance the education of the public in matters relating to the sea, both inland and flood water safety.

On 12 April 2019 the JLA was declared as a Search and Rescue (SAR) facility to the Jersey Coastguard. This was the result of a comprehensive assessment process which examined the suitability of both the vessel and the facility. This was achieved using a combination of the Small Commercial Vessel Code and the Rescue Boat Code.

This means that the boat, policies, and crew have been assessed at a standard necessary to allow them to perform services as a declared SAR asset within the existing Jersey SAR framework.

2.8 JLA TRAINING POLICY

The JLA Training Policy covers all the requirements for both the All-Weather Lifeboat and the Inshore Lifeboat.

JLA training and assessment takes the form of both nationally recognised qualifications and in-house, type specific training and assessment.

The Training Officer identifies the individual training needs of crewmembers. The coxswains oversee in-house training, which may be delivered by themselves, or other competent and experienced crew.

Following in-house training, competence will be assessed by an independent Training Assessor (TA).

2.8.1 JLA Training

The JLA Training Policy covers the requirements for both the All-Weather Lifeboat and the Inshore Lifeboat and has produced a Training Plan for all JLA crew members to complete prior to becoming a qualified crew member.

The training records for each crew member are recorded and include;

- Training Event;
- Type of exercise;
- Role of attendee;
- Duration; and
- Attendance.

The tables below identify the requirements required for each individual role on the lifeboat.

Table 4: All Crew

Subject	Training Type	Assessment	Re- Assessment	Notes
Donning and correct use of personal buoyancy. Use of harness lines.	In House	TA	none	**This must be completed before going afloat.**
Basic first aid training – **required before crew is operational.**	RYA 1 day course	RYA Instructor	Every 3 years	May be replaced by higher qualifications.
Lifeboat familiarisation and specific training – **required before crew are operational.**	In House	TA	Every 5 years	
Additional training -must be completed within 6 months of crew becoming operational.	In House	TA	Every 5 years	

Table 5: Navigators

Subject	Training Types	Assessment	Re - Assessment	Notes
Core navigational skills	RYA Yachtmaster coastal / offshore, RYA Advanced Powerboat, RYA Powerboat theory.	RYA Instructor	None	RYA coastal /offshore practical course acceptable.
Radar Operation	RYA radar course	RYA Instructor	None	Not required by holders of RYA coastal/ offshore practical course (Power).
Short range VHF DSC operators – **must be completed within 12 months of navigator pass out**	RYA course	RYA Instructor	None	
Proficient in using vessels' navigation systems including Radar / DF	In House	TA	5 years	
Ability to update electronic charts.	In House	TA	5 years	
Familiarisation of MANCHEPLAN Grid system	In House	TA	5 years	
Search planning	In House	TA	5 years	

Table 6: Coxswain

Subject	Training Types	Assessment	Re-assessment	Notes
All sections of the Navigator training must be completed				
Core boat handling, practical navigation, and seamanship skills	Any of the following: Advanced Power boat, Yachtmaster offshore, (power) practical training, Competent Crew	RYA Examination	None	
Vessel-specific boat handling, open water, and close quarters	In house	TA	5 years	
Managing towing operations	In house	TA	5 years	
Vessel-specific Man Overboard recovery	In house	TA	5 years	
Fire Fighting Updates	External		3 Years	

Table 7: Medic

Subject	Training Types	Assessment	Re-assessment	Notes
Core skills training	3-day First Aid at Work training by nationally recognised organisation	Recognized trainer	Every 3 years	Resuscitation refresher annually, assessed by recognised first aid trainer or JLA Medical Officer.
Oxygen therapy	In house	JLA Medical Officer	Every 3 years	
Entonox therapy	In house	JLA Medical Officer	Every 3 years	
Use of haemostatic dressings	In house	JLA Medical officer	Every 3 years	
Use of AED	Suitable nationally recognised training	Recognised trainer	Every 3 years	
Advanced Medical Training will be Delivered as written in Clinical Governance Policy Document		Advanced Medical /Casualty Care Trainer	Every 3/5 Years Additional Updates will be carried out on a regular Basis	

3 JLA SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS)

MECAL (International Marine Consultants) reviewed and audited the Declared Facility Checklist on 10 April 2019 prior to the JLA being declared a Search And Rescue (SAR) for the Jersey Coastguard (JCG).

The audit was attended by members of the JCG and JLA. The recommendations below were taken from the audit.

- Operational Policy & procedures manual;
    - All actions completed and the process is appropriate;
- Health and Safety Policy Statement;
    - Extend the aim of the policy to cover responsibility towards third parties, completed;
- JLA Accident and Near Miss Policy;
    - The policy is generally considered appropriate and fit for purpose;
- Control of Hazardous Substances;
    - The Policy is considered fully comprehensive and fit for purpose;
- Confirmation of reinsurance for the *Sir Max Aitken III;*
    - Submit revised insurance policy to cover vessel operations as an SAR asset in UK/CI/French waters. Policy is sufficient;
- Clinical Governance Framework Document;
    - Fifteen associated medical polices are comprehensive and all had been written and signed off;
- Standard Operating Procedures;
    - Standard Operating procedures are generally comprehensive and appear fit for purpose;
- JLA Training Policy;
    - Training Plan for All Crew (Crew Navigators, Coxswains, Medics and Mechanics) completed ;
    - Training Structure, review of the D4H input/outputs completed;
    - Training Manuals, sighted and deemed appropriate;
    - Training Delivery, Evidence was provided from External Training Assessor (TA);
    - Coxswains oversee in- house training, which may be delivered by themselves, or other competent and experienced crew;
    - Training Evaluation to be reviewed;
    - Training Verification documented on Emergency Response software system;
    - Training Records documented on D4H system; and
    - Qualifications in progress.

3.1 PERSONNEL & TRAINING EQUIPMENT MANAGEMENT, INCIDENT REPORTING & ANALYSIS

The JLA utilises an Emergency Response software system which is a fully integrated suite of emergency response software which records all:

- Personnel & Training records;
- Equipment Management;
- Incident Management; and
- Incident Reporting.

Table 8 is a summary of the JLA Training and Qualifications as defined in the JLA Personnel & Training Equipment Management, Incident Reporting & Analytics reporting system.

Table 8: JLA Personnel & Training Equipment Management. Incident Reporting & Analytics.

No	Training details	Responsibility	Investigation Comment
1	Training Exercises	JLA	All exercises are documented with description, times and attendance.
2	Training Attendance	JLA	All training exercises attendees documented.
3	Incident Records	JLA	All Incidents are documented with description, times, weather and attendance.
4	Maintenance Records	JLA	All maintenance documented with description and attendance.
5	Qualifications	JLA	All qualifications are documented against each crew member.
6	Crew Availability	JLA	All crewmembers' availability is documented.
7	Equipment Management	JLA	All inspections and service records documented.
8	Training Delivery	JLA	Training Medical Assessor identified, Casualty Care Check Cards and Clinical Governance Framework documents available.
9	Training Manuals	JLA	Are operational manuals current and readily available?

4 ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 CAUSATION

At 21:42 on 10 November the JLA *Sir Max Aitken ALB* crew were paged for assembly and launch for a sailing yacht entangled in fishing gear 5nm NW of jersey.

At 22:10 on 10 November 2021, The Jersey Coastguard (JCG) received a VHF call from the JLA *Sir Max Aitken III* stating that she had run aground on the Pierre au Poisson rocks off Noirmont Point, Pos Lat 49° 09.922'N Long 002°10.412'W.

- As this was considered a non-urgent response, all equipment ought to have been set up and operational prior to sailing;
- It was the navigator's responsibility to set up and plan the route on the chart plotter; however, he took over the VHF communications with the JCG;
- It was the mechanic's responsibility after starting the ME to take over the VHF communications, but as the navigator was on the VHF, so he began setting up the chart plotter in order to input an initial waypoint;
- The mechanic applied the waypoint for the casualty vessel's position rather than a final position which subsequently meant that the navigator could not set a route ;
- The coxswain requested a full route to be set up for a more accurate ETA. The navigator then tried to build up a route to the casualty vessel's final position, which was not offered on the chart plotter, which rendered him confused;
- The navigator was fully focussed on trying to set up a new route in order to update the JCG with an ETA which meant he lost his situation awareness;
- The chart plotter is situated behind the coxswain position;
- The coxswain was distracted and turned around on more than one occasion to assess the situation with the navigator;
- The distracted coxswain, now facing backwards, lost his spatial awareness and made two unintentional and unnoticed small turns to starboard;
- The glare of the forward-facing chart plotter caused luminosity pollution against the windows, which affected the coxswain's night vision;
- The plotter repeater did not start properly which meant it was not readily available for the coxswain to use facing forward; and
- Lack of a dedicated lookout.

4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Table 9: Recommendations

#	Description	Authority	Close out date
1	Harbour Authority review and audit of the JLA Safety Management System (SMS) and Personnel training syllabus.	PoJ	
2	Bridge Team Management, training and regularly exercised.	JLA	
3	All equipment to be set up and fully operational prior to sailing.	JLA	
4	Qualified personnel for Trauma Risk Management (TRIM) to be identified.	JLA	
5	Training Matrix to be identified.	JLA	
6	All crew members to fully understand their roles and responsibilities through a toolbox pre departure briefing prior to sailing.	JLA	
7	After an incident of this nature all crew members are to receive a professional medical / trauma examination before resuming duty.	JLA	
8	Chart Plotter to be re positioned to a more suitable position in front of the coxswain.	JLA	
9	Statement of Facts to be taken as soon as reasonably practicable.	PoJ / JLA	
10	Harbour Authority to consider the need to extend their Drug and Alcohol powers within their authorised jurisdiction.	PoJ	

5 CONCLUSIONS

Whilst on call and on passage to a sailing vessel entangled in fishing gear 5nm NW of Jersey the JLB *Sir Max Aiken III* made contact and ran aground onto the Pierre au Poisson rocks.

Facts Established:

- The weather conditions were fine, wind SSE 5- 10 kts, sea state slight with good visibility;
- It was observed that the night was moonless and pitch dark;
- All Aids to Navigation (AtN) for the passage were in good working order;
- This was considered a non-urgent incident; therefore, all equipment should have been set up and been fully operational prior to departure;
- The setting up of the chart potter while underway distracted the coxswain, who was now facing aft, lost his spatial awareness and made two unintentional and unnoticed small turns to starboard;
- There were no reported defects on the JLB *Sir Max Aiken III;*
- The *Sir Max Aiken III* is a Jersey declared SAR facility; and
- The coxswain and navigator are both highly experienced.

The recommendations in section **4.2** above should be followed up and assigned appropriate ownerships and priorities to ensure they can be closed out with due urgency.

Annex A Incident Report Form

JERSEY COASTGUARD

INCIDENT REPORT – JE173/4

I was the duty Acting Harbour Master on the night of Wednesday 10th November 2021, here is the timeline of events:

- 2132 - I was at home when I received at phone call from the Maritime Operations Centre (MOC) informing me of an 11m French sailing vessel (SV) with 5 pob which had become entangled in fishing gear NW of Banc Des Ormes west cardinal buoy, vessel callsign 'Macif 28'. She had been on passage from Cherbourg to Paimpol in Northern Brittany with another French SV 'Macif 31'. The wind was calm, sea state smooth/slight, tide 8.8m and approaching HW (2230 / 9m.) After a short discussion with the Coastguard Watch Officer (CGWO) we decided to assemble the JLA ALB to locate and assist the casualty. As this was a non urgent incident, there was no need for me to attend the MOC and assist the CGWO.
- 2210 – The CGWO called me to say that the JLA ALB had reported they had "hit rocks off Noirmont Pt" no further information. The decision was made to bring the RNLI St Helier ALB & ILB (SHALB & SHILB) to 'Immediate Readiness' via the RNLI paging system. *Immediate Readiness means making the vessels ready for tasking, but remain on their berth(s).* I then made my into the MOC.
- 2218 – CGWO called me as I was parking at Maritime House, I was told the JLA ALB was still assessing their situation, but there did not believe they were taking on water. At this point I decided to dispatch the SHALB to the original casualty and request that the JLA ALB to return to St Helier. The SHILB to remain on their berth but be ready to immediately launch and assist the JLA ALB should the need arise.
- 2219 – I arrived in the MOC and assumed role as Search Mission Co-ordinator (SMC), everything appeared calm and under control. The JLA ALB was still in the vicinity of Noirmont Pt and the SHALB was just getting ready to launch to the initial casualty. I logged into Vision Incident Management software and assisted the CGWO with comms. The Commordore Clipper had requested permission to depart the harbour, the CGWO had advised them that an incident had occurred in the Western/North Western passage and that they should seek an alternative route. The Master was going to recalculate route and call VTS back.
- 2221 – JLA ALB is observed on VTMS as returning back to port.
- 2222 – SHALB requests permission to depart.
- 2237 – I called the Harbour Master [redacted] and informed him of what had happened and what our new plan of action was.
- 2246 – JLA ALB is observed approaching her berth via CCTV camera 15, at the time it is believed that she collided with 'MV Maresia' which is berthed north of the JLA pontoon. (A request was made to secure the CCTV footage.)
- 2248 – SHILB was stood down.
- 2258 – HM sent a brief email to [redacted] (head of communications) [redacted] (CEO) [redacted] (HM) & [redacted] (Chief of Staff) outlining the incident
- 2248-0200/11th I remained in the MOC to assist the CGWO and in that time I:
  - Submitted an PoJ IT SR to have the VTMS recordings saved
  - Submitted a request to have the CCTV footage of the perceived collision between JLA ALB & MV Maresia
  - Emailed the same group as indicated in 2258 above, the concise timeline of events
  - Continued to assist with incident comms between casualty, assets and Cross Jobourg.
  - Advised Marine Leisure Centre via email that the JLA ALB may require hoisting out of the water in the morning
  - Compiled a report for our internal investigation process – Q-Pulse

NB : On review of the CCTV footage, no contact was observed between the JLA ALB and the MV Maresia.

Annex B Duty Watch Officer, JCG SoF

Statement from [redacted]

On duty watch officer, Jersey Coastguard / St Helier VTS.

10th November 2021

I was on watch at the MOC at Jersey Coastguard / St Helier VTS on the evening 10th November 2021. I was in the MOC single manning from 21:00 to 06:00 with a duty officer on call at all times. The winds were light (2 to 4 knots) from the South, fair weather and good visibility.

Approx. 21:00 I observed on radar two AIS targets, Massif 28 and Massif 31 approx. 6 miles NW of Jersey. It is not unusual to see vessels in our waters at any time of the day or night.

21:32 I received a phone call from Cross Jobourg (XJB), our neighbouring French coastguard station, requesting diving assistance for a 11m sailing boat with 5 people on board, NW of the island that was caught on fishing gear at a Lat and Long which matched the AIS position of Massif 28 seen on our VTMS. Massif 31 was alongside the casualty and had been trying to assist for some time with no avail. No injuries on board and they were just requesting assistance to free the propellor.

21:32 I called the Duty Officer (AHM) and relayed the information received from XJB and discussed which asset we should use to assist. With no immediate threat to life the JLA all-weather lifeboat (ALB) was discussed as the correct asset to assist. It meant should the situation escalate, the RNLI ALB which is faster than the JLA ALB, was still available for either another incident, or to assist with this one.

21:36 I called up Massif 31 to get a situation report, check there was no immediate danger, and to confirm they were still fouled on fishing gear. They confirmed the information we already had and that there was no immediate risk. They spoke very good English, was very loud and clear and appeared very calm, which all went to assure me that the choice of asset was correct.

21:39 I called [redacted] the coxswain of the JLA ALB. I relayed the information of the casualty and gave him a brief situation report (sitrep) and he confirmed they were available to assist.

21:42 The JLA ALB was paged for crew assemble (a non-blue light response) and gave brief instructions to the crew in the page. "Crew assemble all weather lifeboat... 11m SV stock on F gear - NW of island - edge of TTW).

21:45 I call XJB confirming we had tasked a lifeboat, and they verified the propellor was approx. 1m below the surface and they required divers. I advised that the lifeboat had equipment that could assist with fouled props below the surface, a common occurrence in our waters.

21:46 I made a further call to [redacted] on his mobile advising the prop was 1m below the surface and confirming this was still within the scope of their equipment and this was confirmed.

21:57 Sir Max (JLA ALB) called on VHF 82 stating they were launching on service – the person on the radio was [redacted] (a member of the Ports of Jersey staff). 82 is the coastguard working channel, and as this was a situation with no threat to life, this was the correct channel to use. Tasking details and location was passed to Sir Max, and they relayed their crew numbers back to us (each crew has an ID number, so in case of an incident we have a formal record of who was on board).

22:05 Commodore Clipper (CLP) called St Helier VTS on VHF 14 and advised they would be departing in 10 minutes.

22:10 A call was received on VH F82 from a person (not [redacted]) stating they had hit rocks and were making a further assessment. It was clear from this person's tone of voice and urgency of their speech, something serious had occurred.

22:10 I immediately called the AHM stating the JLA had hit rocks at Noirmont Point and awaiting update, and it was my intention to immediately page the RNLI. The AHM confirmed both boats should be paged, (their ALB and the ILB) and he would make his way to the Maritime Operations Centre.

22:12 I paged the RNLI using the immediate readiness status, which is a blue light urgent response for both boats

22:13 I then tried to call Sir Max on VHF 82 to seek an update. There was no reply on VHF 82, and fearing the worst, I called them on VHF 16 using the mayday prefix and still received no reply.

22:14 Sir Max then called ([redacted]) on VHF 82 stating they are still assessing damage, but there is no water ingress. I advised them the St Helier ALB and the St Helier inshore lifeboats had been paged to assist, and he responded they did not require any further assistance at this time. The tone of voice from [redacted] was serious and unsettled. Given they were assessing damage the RNLI lifeboats were not stood down, in case the situation escalated once they tried to return to port.

22:17 Commodore Clipper calls VTS asking for permission out to the West on VHF 14. I advised the Master that an incident was ongoing at Noirmont Point, and requested they depart using an alternative route. The master advised he would call back once he had amended his passage plan.

22:18 [redacted] called and given update that Sir Max had been called up, no water ingress and no assistance had been requested. [redacted] advised to allow the St H ALB to be tasked to the original incident and to depart immediately, request Sir Max return to port, and request the St Helier ILB to be on standby at the dock ready to launch should things escalate. With the St H ALB already en route we had an asset on the water heading past Noirmont, should things with Sir Max escalate.

22:19 The [redacted] arrives in the MOC

22:22 The St Helier ALB requested permission with St Helier VTS on VHF 14 to launch on service. They are told the CLP is about to depart and they should respect the red lights. The Clipper hears this call and states will hold until the lifeboat has passed. The lifeboat it told to depart ahead of the Clipper.

22:25 Sir Max is observed on AIS and radar to be returning to port and they called up on VHF 82 stating they had lost steering. I requested if they needed any assistance which they declined, and their track on our equipment was slow and steady.

22:28 St Helier ALB departs through the pierheads and the Clipper is advised they can now depart to the South, avoiding the area of Noirmont Point (although Sir Max was now clear of the area).

22:29 St Helier ILB calls and states they are still on the dock awaiting further instructions.

22:30 Discussion with the [redacted] when to stand down the St H ILB. It is decided that once Sir Max is back on berth to stand them down as the vessel could take on water or have further difficulties at any time during their return.

22:33 Sir Max called to advise of departure of CLP to south and St H ALB en route to original casualty. There is no response from Sir Max, but they are observed on equipment still making way back to port. There is no added concern due to this.

22:37 [redacted] calls the harbourmaster to advise of the incident.

22:42 St Helier ALB advises us of their ETA to casualty vessel. This is passed onto Massif 28 and XJB.

22:46 Sir Max is observed back in the harbour and makes way onto berth.

22:48 St Helier ILB is called and stood down.

Original incident continues and is resolved successfully with the St H ALB returning to station towing Massif 28 at 0400.

Noirmoint Point, Les Fours, Raudiere are all observed on CCTV as being lit and working throughout this timeline on CCTV playback.

Signed: [redacted]

Annex C Ports of Jersey Incident Report Form

PORTS OF JERSEY
YOUR ISLAND GATEWAY

Incident report form

Pilots, PEC holders and Masters

It is a requirement that all incidents or near misses are reported to the Harbour Master. This is a necessary requirement to allow a full investigation into causes and to identify trends or potential future hazards. Corrective action can then be implemented.

This Incident Report Form must be used by all authorised Pilots, Pilotage Exemption Holders (PEC), and Vessel Masters to report any navigational or safety incident, or near miss, within Jersey Territorial Seas to the Harbour Master.

Urgent navigational matters should be reported immediately to the Maritime Operations Centre through: Jersey Coastguard on VHF Ch 82, St Helier VTS on VHF Ch 14 or telephone +44 (0) 1534 447704.A follow-up written report may be required in support of verbal notice and advice, for which this form is to be used.

Section one : Type of incident				
Incident Type *Tick the relevant boxes – leave blank if not applicable*	Berthing/manoeuvring	☐	Loss of hull integrity	☐
	Collision	☐	Navigational hazard	☐
	Contact	☒	Near miss	☐
	Enforcement	☐	Personal injury / fatality	☐
	Fire / explosion	☐	Pilotage directions	☐
	General directions	☐	Pollution	☐
	Grounding	☒	Swamping	☐
	Inappropriate navigation	☐	Wash	☐
	Other	☐	Attach copy of report	

Section two : Statistical data			
Piloted vessel	Pilot's name and P number	N/A	
PEC vessel	PEC holder's name	N/A	
	PEC holder's number	N/A	
Master	Name	[redacted]	
	Company address	N/A	
		N/A	
Vessel name	Sir Max Aitken III		
Other vessel's name	N/A		
Object name	Pierre au Poisson rock		
Date of incident	10th November 2021	**Time of incident (UTC)**	22:08 UTC
Passage	Last port of call	St Helier	
	Next port of call	St Helier	
Place or position of occurrence		49°09.92'N 002°10.39'W	

Please complete as much of the form as you consider necessary and return to the Harbour Master at Maritime House, La Route du Port Elizabeth, St Helier, Jersey JE1 1HB or email harbourmaster@ports.je
Should we require further information, we will contact you directly.

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Section three : Additional statistical information – vessel details				
Type		SAR All Weather Lifeboat - Tyne Class		
Port of registry		Jersey		
Nationality		N/A		
Owners		Jersey Lifeboat Association		
Agents		N/A		
Master and crew nationality		N/A		
Tonnage	GRT	14.70	Net	N/A
Length (m)	LOA	14.30m	Waterline	N/A
Draft (m)	Fwd	1.45m	Aft	1.45m
Propulsion	Main	2 x GM6V92 DDEC marine diesel engines	HP	525hp each at 2,300rpm
	Bow/stern thrusters	None		
Propellers	Number	2	Type	Fixed pitch - outward
	Rotation (RH/LH)	N/A		
Speed (kts)	Max	18 kts	Manoeuvring	N/A
Redder type		Standard		
Navigational	Charts	*Including chart numbers and latest corrections*		
		Raymarine hybridtouch chart plotter		
	Port passage plan *(attach plan)*	No	Compass type	Click or tap here to enter text.
	Compass type	Magnetic	Steering mode	Hand
		Number, band, operational deficiencies		
	Radars	1 Furuno FR 8050 D		
	Echo sounder	Furuno FCV 600 L	Other nav aids	Chart plotter repeater
		Number, channels monitored, operational?		
	VHF	Sailor Compact VHF RT2048		
	Defects	None that we are aware		

Section four : Navigational information relating to incident

Please complete as much of the form as you consider necessary and return to the Harbour Master at Maritime House, La Route du Port Elizabeth, St Helier, Jersey JE1 1HB or email harbourmaster@ports.je
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Heading		310° T	Speed (kts)	17.5 kts
Weather	Wind *speed (kts) and direction*	SSE | 5-10 kts	Sea state	Slight
	Visibility	Good	Light	Dark, no moon
Tidal	Height ACD (m)	8.8 m	HW/LW (UTC)	LW: 16:45 | 3.0m HW: 22:28 | 8.9m
Regulations	Lookout	4		
	Lights/shapes *Displayed*	Motor vessel underway		
	Sound signals *Used at time of incident*	None		
Other relevant information		N/A		

Section five : Communications

Relevant communication to / from the Harbour Authority **before** incident
Tasked to casualty vessel. Wind and tide communicated. Casualty positioned and relevant information communicated to vessel.
Relevant communication to / from the Harbour Authority **after** incident
Clear and concise communication to and from Jersey Coastguards (JCG) informing them about incident, position, no water ingress, no apparent pollution, no personal injury and propulsion working with steering damaged but available. Vessel informed JCG that it did not need assistance and that it was coming back to St Helier unaided. Proactive thinking of JCG requesting Commodore Clipper to depart to the South and keep clear of W passage.
Specific directions from St Helier VTS / Jersey Coastguard / Duty Harbour Master
No specific directions given. Vessel confirmed to JCG that they are off station until further notice.

Are VDR recordings available to assist with investigation?	Not from the vessel. Potentially from the MOC

Section six : Damage

Please complete as much of the form as you consider necessary and return to the Harbour Master at Maritime House, La Route du Port Elizabeth, St Helier, Jersey JE1 1HB or email harbourmaster@ports.je
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Own vessel	Damage included: - Bent hull on both starboard and portside (no hole and no water ingress) - Portside rudder inoperational (starboard side rudder fully operational and not damaged) - Portside propeller dented blades (both propulsion working at near full capacity) - Both bilge keels damaged - Above waterline starboard belting (steel made) damaged
Second vessel	N/A
Object	N/A

Section seven : Account of incident

Detail below an account, in chronological order of the incident. Include in the account the authorities contacted and conclude with reasoning/thoughts for why the incident occurred.
Sketches or photographs should accompany this report as appropriate

Timeline of incident:
21:42 - JLA ALB Sir Max Aitken III (Sir Max) tasked for crew assemble
21:57: Sir Max launched. 7 POB, crew numbers given to JCG: 1, 9, 12, 21, 28, 18, 24. The navigator was on the radio comms whilst the mechanic was dealing with engines and preparing the plotter in order to enter the casualty vessel's position. Navigator requested VTS on VHF 14 to depart and proceed out to caualty vessel. Permission granted.
22:00: Navigator obtained position of casualty 49°19.65'N 002°18.76'W, approx. 5nm NW of Jersey. Sailing vessel stuck on fishing gear. All persons on board ok, casualty vessel is MASSI 28 assisted by Massi 31.
22:02: Navigator communicated the casualty vessel's position to the Mechanic who entered it into the chart plotter. Both the Navigtaor and the Mechanic both validated the information in order to obtain the Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) at the position of the casualty vessel. Navigator confirmed ETA to JCG on VHF 82.
22:05: Coxswain requested the route to be set up in order to obtain a more accurate ETA as the current route was not taking into account the fact that Sir Max had to go all the way around the island.
The navigator then tried to build a route, the functionality of building a route to the final destination of the casualty vessel was not offered to the navigator, which rended him confused. The navigator therefore tried to set waypoints manually and build a route from the beginning, which took some time. During this time, the coxswain turned around on a few occasions because of the plotter's position behind him (astern of the coxswain position). During this time, the mechanic was setting up the plotter's repeater (iPad).
22:08: Contact with rock Pierre au Poisson.
22:09: Mechanic contacted JCG on VHF 89 that Sir Max had hit a rock South of Noirmont. Other crew checked for damage and well being of all crew members.
22:14: Navigator contacted JCG on VHF 82 to inform that crew had assessed damages, no water ingress, no apparent pollution, no person injured, rudder damaged but still operational and both propulasion working in

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order.
22:16: Navigator confirmed to JCG on VHF 82 no need of assistance.
22:25: Navigator confirmed to JCG on VHF 82 that Sir Max would return to station at slow speed without need of assistance.
22:48: Sir Max back on station. The crew undertook a thorough verification of the vessel in order to confirm no water ingress and no pollution and completed a very short debrief.
23:14: The navigator contacted JCG on VHF 82 to inform them that the vessel was back to station and that Sir Max would be off station (off call) until further notice.
23:20: JLA Responsible Person contacted to inform of incident.
23:21: The navigator tried to contact the Certifying Authority with no success (subsequently called the next morning followed by an email) and the insurers were called the next morning. The crew undertook a final verification of the vessel in order to confirm no water ingress and no apparent pollution. All crew felt extremely tired and under shock and all went back home with no apparent injury.

Reasoning:
1- Navigator taking up radio communications instead of mechanic until the vessel was well underway (less time to subsequently set up the route on the plotter)
2- Mechanic setting up the chart plotter instead of the navigator (applied waypoint for casualty vessel's position rather than a final position which subsenquently meant that the navigator could not set a route)
3- The chart plotter is situated behind the helm and therefore, the coxswain had to momentally face backwards in order to see the plotter (loss of spacial awareness). This also meant that when having a hand on the rudder, turning to the right in order to look back to see the plotter meant that the wheel was also slightly turned to starboard without the coxswain realissing (two small starboard alterations visible on the chart plotter).
4- The plotter repeater did not start properly which meant it was not available for the coxswain to use facing forward
5- The navigator kept focusing on trying to set up a route in order to update JCG with an accurate ETA which meant he lost situation awareness despite the coxswain advising him seconds before the impact to put the chart back on. The navigator was also not looking out due to the location of the plotter.
6- Dark night without moon menat that it was more difficult for the lookout crew standing outside to see the land.
7- The glare from the plotter facing forward meant there was a slight luminosity pollution against the forward windows and made it more difficult to see outside.

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Pictures attached:



Picture 1: casualty position and route in progress at moment of impact

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

Picture 2: route followed before and after moments after impact

Name	[redacted]
Position	Coxswain
Date of report	17 November 2021 (finalised)
Signature	[redacted]

Please complete as much of the form as you consider necessary and return to the Harbour Master at Maritime House, La Route du Port Elizabeth, St Helier, Jersey JE1 1HB or email harbourmaster@ports.je
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Annex D Delegated Harbour Master SoF

Statement of fact from [redacted]

Delegated Harbour Master on 10th November 2021.

I received the call from [redacted] who was SMC at 2237 regarding the SAR incident and was advised that the JLA ALB had struck rocks at Noirmont whilst on passage.

I was advised the incident was under control with the RNLI ALB being paged to the original incident and the JLA returning to St Helier. I waited for my wife to get home (as my two children were at home asleep) and left my home address at approx 2315 and headed to the Albert Pier to meet the crew of the JLA in my capacity as delegated Harbour Master.

I wanted to check that the crew were ok and speak to them briefly before they headed home, I called [redacted] (JLA Coxswain) on his mobile who was onboard the JLA ALB before driving in and said I would be down shortly, [redacted] acknowledged and said he and the crew would wait for me.

I arrived at around 2335 and saw the crew of the JLA ALB. The crew appeared in shock but confirmed that they were all ok and were not suffering any injuries and no one required any medical attention.

We discussed briefly what had happened and I observed some damage on the starboard side of the hull. We discussed planning for a hoist out of the vessel in the morning and [redacted] told me he had tried to get hold of MECAL (certifying authority).

Whilst I was on the pontoons, I took [redacted] to one side and suggested that he might want to consider being breathylsed, primarily to protect himself and rule this out as a factor. I said that I couldn't confirm that States of Jersey Police would be able to perform this but said we would ask if it was wanted. [redacted] said that he wanted to get home because he was due to go to France early the next morning to take his catch. During the conversation he told me he had two glasses of wine with his dinner and confirmed that he didn't want to take a breathalyser test.

I checked again that the crew didn't require any medical attention and left at the same time as the JLA crew.

I then headed to the Maritime Operations Centre (MOC) to speak to [redacted] and [redacted] who were on watch and to check on the status of the original SAR incident.

Signed.....[redacted]

Annex E JLA Coxswain SoF

Statement by [redacted]

On Wednesday 10th of November at 21.42 we were tasked by Jersey Coastguard to assist a French yacht that was tangled in fishing gear off Jerseys NW Coast.

On arrival we prepared the Lifeboat for sea as we normally do, running our checks aboard, contacting the Coast Guard and passing crew numbers over.

As we left the berth using the Upper steering position until we left the harbour and then I took control below where the radar and plotter is positioned.

We made our way out through the small roads and preceded towards the west, [redacted] was mechanic and [redacted] was sorting out the Chart Plotter. We were traveling at about 17kts the sea was calm with maybe a 1.5-meter swell, there was no moon and it was pitch black.

Everything was fine the radar was on and tuned, I asked [redacted] to put a route in the plotter while we were heading across St Aubin's bay towards Noirmont Point on a course of 270- 275 passing South of le pignonet and Noirmont at this point, I was distracted with the chart plotter glare on the windows as it was not on night mode so I turned around to see what the problem was, and asked to put the chart back on. At this point unknowingly I have changed course to approximately 290 while looking behind me when we hit.

We hit hard which I think was on the keel and then it rode up and hit again on the starboard side rolling onto her port side before being righted. I took the boat out of gear immediately. I had no idea what we had hit at first. I checked that everyone was ok, and asked the crew to check for damage and notify the Coast Guard that we had hit rocks . There was no water ingress so once on deck we seemed to be surrounded by rocks. I tried to go astern as I saw a rock ahead uncover in the swell when the crew shouted I took the engines out of gear and touched again. I managed to turn on one engine enough to manoeuvre in to safer water where it came apparent that we had lost steering. I asked the Mechanic to disconnect the Rudder link bar which enabled us to get steerage back using the starboard rudder. The rock we had hit was the Pierre au poisson.

I asked the crew again to check for damage and also to check for diesel leaks and the fuel separators we checked the shafts to make sure they were ok turning them by hand. Fortunately this was ok, I asked if everyone was ok again and started heading back to St Helier. Everyone was calm and professional.

It was difficult entering our berth with only one rudder working but arrived back alongside without contact to the boat next to us. We waited around for about 30 minutes to wait for the deputy Harbour Master to talk to us all.

Once alongside we checked the damage and I think the shock started to hit us all I felt absolutely shattered and sick.

I apologized to the crew for being distracted which led to us hitting. I have been a Fisherman for 34 years and a Lifeboat Coxswain and crew member for over 30 years and this is the first Accident I've had and I am extremely disappointed with it. I cannot fault the crew who were all fantastic and professional.

We have a highly trained and experienced crew the boat is highly maintained and Fortunately nobody was hurt and the boat was now safe and back in the harbour and I hope can be repaired.

I asked for a crew debrief on Friday night to discuss the accident and see what went wrong, what went well, and we can do to prevent this from happening again.

Signed

Annex F JLA Navigator SoF

[redacted]

Statement of account on the incident 10th November 2021

The Jersey Lifeboat Association (JLA) crew was tasked at 21:43 UTC on the 10th November 2021. I made my way to the station and subsequently to the vessel. On arrival, I took charge of the radio communications with Jersey Coastguards (JCG) on VHF 82 whilst the Mechanic was starting the engines.

I contacted St Helier VTS to request permission to proceed out. I remained on the radio until I obtained all the necessary information concerning the casualty vessel, this was done after clearing the Platte beacon. During all this time, the Mechanic had started the plotter in order to enter the position of the casualty vessel.

When I had confirmation from JCG of all the information regarding the casualty vessel, I then decided to help the Mechanic enter the position on the plotter. The screen to enter the casualty position was already up. Once the position was entered, both the Mechanic and myself validated the information in order to obtain the Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) at the position of the casualty vessel.

At that time, I confirmed our ETA to JCG on VHF 82. After a few minutes, the Coxswain requested the route to be set up in order to obtain a more accurate ETA as the current route was not taking into account the fact that we had to go all the way around the island.

As I tried to build a route, the functionality of building a route to the final destination of the casualty vessel was not offered to me, it is usually possible to build a route selecting a position as the final position and adding waypoint into it. I was therefore confused as to why this was not possibe. I therefore tried to set waypoints manually and build a route from the beginning, which took some time. During this time, the coxswain turned around a few times because of the plotter's position behind him (astern of the coxswain position). The plotter was also facing forward so that the Coxswain could look at it and it is only after the incident that I realised that it had not been set to night mode however, the plotter's dimmer was set to minimum.

During this time, the Mechanic was setting up the plotter's repeater which is an iPad using an app. It is at that point that we hit a rock. After the contact with the rock, I heard one of the crew member contacting JCG to inform them about the contact. I therefore quickly checked the engine compartment via the engine door window and went directly forward to check for water ingress (under the coxswain request) and aft where I saw the other crew members checking the aft cabin. After ensuring that there was no water ingress, no apparent pollution, no injury to the crew and that the propulsion was still operational, I contacted JCG on VHF 82 to inform them that we would return to the station at slow speed with a damaged rudder and that we did not need assistance (one rudder was still operational as well as both starboard and portside propulsion). I also informed them that the rock hit was Pierre au Poisson.

Once alongside, I contacted JCG to inform them that we were back to station and that we would be off station until further notice. I tried to contact the Certifying Authority with no success (subsequently called the next morning followed by an email) and the insurers were called the next morning. The crew undertook a thorough verification of the vessel in order to confirm no water ingress and no pollution and completed a very short debrief. We then all felt extremely tired and under shock and went back home.

All the way throughout the incident, the Coxswain remained calm, focused and in control taking all necessary actions to safeguard and ensure the safety of his crew and of his vessel. In addition, the crew have shown professionalism and a high level of competence when dealing with this kind of

situation with all the necessary actions being taken in order to safeguard the integrity of the vessel and the safety of the crew (i.e. the Mechanic instantly requesting the liferaft to be ready).

The Coxswain apologised to the crew for what had happened, which we asked him not to as these kinds of accidents are not the fault of one person but are a succession of preventable events/failures leading to the accident itself. The JLA completed a full debrief two days after and discussed the controls to be put in place in order to ensure that this accident does not happen again. Fortunately, the experience of the crew as well as the high maintenance and strong built of the vessel helped preventing anyone being injured.